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Abstract 
 
Companies can gain additional efficiency in designing and 
implementing or assessing internal control by focusing on only those 
financial reporting objectives directly applicable to the company’s activities 
and circumstances, taking a risk based approach to internal control. It is 
important for any organization to have reliable financial data for internal 
decision-making purpose. Financial information is often useful in many 
internal decisions such as product or service pricing. This is why the most 
important function of the controller is to create and maintain the corporate 
financial control system. Today’s corporation operates in an increasingly 
complex environment and the controller’s role is to advice the management 
of current or future problems of the business environment or to prevent the 
fraud. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is a survey on what an internal control means. 
Internal control cannot ensure by itself the achievement of its general objectives; 
internal control consists of five interrelated components: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. 
According to INTOSAI, the control environment sets the tone of an organization, 
influencing the control consciousness of its staff. Thus, internal control is not an 
event or circumstance, but a series of actions that permeate an entity’s activities, 
that occur throughout an entity’s operations on an ongoing basis, and that are 
pervasive and inherent in the way the management runs the organization. 
This research is important because the internal control could prevent fraud. 
There are many studies and articles on this subject, but the fraud became more 
complex than ever and the government witnesses soaring levels of business fraud.  
The aim of this paper is to present that an effective internal control system 
can provide only reasonable assurance to management about the achievement of an 
entity’s objectives or its survival. Internal control can give management 
information about the entity’s progress (or lack of it) toward achievement of the 
objectives; an effective system of internal control reduces the probability of not 
achieving the objectives. This paper is related to other papers that presented similar 
concepts and methods of internal control. 
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Literature review 
The paper has based its conclusions on the researches of the following 
persons: 
Jagannathan, M. (1996), Internal Control Mechanisms and Forced CEO 
Turnover: An Empirical Investigation, who presented his final conclusions in this 
PhD dissertation at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
Jagannathan empirically examines the efficacy of internal control mechanisms by 
analyzing 94 forced turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs). 
Dunn, J. (1996) in Auditing, Theory and Practice, presented the professional 
guidance of the auditor’s responsibilities for the detection of fraud. Thus, auditors 
might have to develop their work based on the internal control.  
COSO (2006), Internal Control over Financial Reporting. Guidance for 
Smaller Public Companies, is an important study to understand internal control. 
Thus, the characteristics of smaller companies provide significant challenges for 
cost-effective internal control. “Among the challenges are: obtaining sufficient 
resources to achieve adequate segregation of duties; management’s ability to 
dominate activities, with significant opportunities for management override of 
control; recruiting individuals with requisite financial reporting and other expertise 
to serve effectively on the board of directors and audit committee; recruiting and 
retaining personnel with sufficient experience and skill in accounting and financial 
reporting; taking management attention from running the business in order to 
provide sufficient focus on accounting and financial reporting”. 
KPMG (1999), Internal Control: A Practical Guide, Service Point is 
presenting an internal guide for internal control. KPMG recommends that all 
directors, including the nonexecutive directors, ensure that they are satisfied that 
the Board’s statement on internal control provides meaningful high-level 
information that enables shareholders to evaluate how the principles of good 
governance have been applied. 
 
Internal control 
Jagannathan empirically examines the efficacy of internal control 
mechanisms by analyzing 94 forced turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs); 
poorly performing managers are removed faster in firms that have a larger 
percentage of independent outside directors on their board, that have higher equity 
ownership by the non-CEO directors and lower equity ownership by the CEO, and 
that separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. “The separation of ownership 
and control that characterizes the modern corporation creates potential conflicts of 
interests between managers and shareholders. The corporate governance system 
that helps resolve such conflicts consists of the internal control system, the external 
market for corporate control, and the discipline of the product and factor markets.” 
(Jagannathan, M., 1996). 
Jagannathan quantifies the association between the probability that a CEO 
will be replaced before significant declines in performance and these board 
characteristics by estimating a logistic regression, and investigates changes in 
internal corporate governance characteristics following turnover to determine 
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whether crisis-response firms institute more significant changes in internal 
governance. Jagannathan examines the changes in compensation structure and in 
pay-to-performance sensitivity, following CEO turnover, for the forced turnover 
sample and for a control sample of normal turnover, and examines the changes in 
market-adjusted operating performance following CEO turnover. Jagannathan 
analyzes the pre-turnover board characteristics of the crisis-response and non-
crisis-response subsamples of firms, compares the changes in these board 
characteristics following turnover, documents changes in CEO compensation 
structure and pay-performance sensitivity pre-to-post turnover (the changes in 
performance around CEO turnover are estimated and related to the changes in 
board characteristics and compensation structures). “The board of directors of a 
corporation is the primary force within the organization for motivating and 
monitoring managerial decisions. They are responsible for designing incentives 
that motivate managers to make decisions consistent with firm value maximization, 
supervising managerial actions, evaluating managerial performance, and removing 
poorly-performing managers.” (Jagannathan, M., 1996). Boards of directors are 
reluctant to remove poorly performing top managers. “While the observed negative 
relationship between firm performance and the probability of managerial turnover 
and significant improvements in operating performance subsequent to forced 
turnover suggest that boards of directors are effective monitors of management, the 
small probability of CEO turnover in even the most poorly performing firms and 
the degree of external control activity that surrounds forced turnover suggest that 
they are weak monitors at best.” (Jagannathan, M., 1996) 
Jagannathan remarks that outside directors (especially if they are truly 
independent) are better monitors of management than are inside directors. 
“Managerial ownership creates two opposing forces in governing managerial 
behaviour: 
 (1) a larger fractional ownership by management ensures a greater alignment 
of managers’ and shareholder’s interests, as management’s higher stakes in their 
firms mean that they bear more of the wealth consequences of their actions. This 
‘convergence of interests’ hypothesis suggests that larger managerial stakes will be 
associated with higher firm value;  
(2) the ‘managerial entrenchment’ hypothesis suggests that higher firm 
ownership by management increases their ability to pursue non-firm-value 
maximizing decisions that improve their own wealth and job security without fear 
of reprisal.” (Jagannathan, M., 1996) 
Jagannathan contends that, in theory, the CEO of a corporation is endowed 
with the power to make investment decisions, while the board of directors (led by 
the chairperson) is responsible for monitoring the CEO by setting goals, designing 
appropriate compensation packages, and evaluating managerial performance. 
“Agency theory suggests that tying managers’ compensation to stock performance 
will increase managers’ incentives to make decisions that are consistent with 
maximizing firm value. […] The agency argument implies that effective boards 
will design compensation contracts that align a large portion of managerial 
earnings with improvements in share value.” (Jagannathan, M., 1996) 
 32 
COSO states that the characteristics of smaller companies provide significant 
challenges for cost-effective internal control. “Among the challenges are: obtaining 
sufficient resources to achieve adequate segregation of duties; management’s 
ability to dominate activities, with significant opportunities for management 
override of control; recruiting individuals with requisite financial reporting and 
other expertise to serve effectively on the board of directors and audit committee; 
recruiting and retaining personnel with sufficient experience and skill in accounting 
and financial reporting; taking management attention from running the business in 
order to provide sufficient focus on accounting and financial reporting; maintaining 
appropriate control over computer information systems with limited technical 
resources.” (COSO, 2006) 
Companies can gain additional efficiency in designing and implementing or 
assessing internal control “by focusing on only those financial reporting objectives 
directly applicable to the company’s activities and circumstances, taking a risk 
based approach to internal control, right sizing documentation, viewing internal 
control as an integrated process, and considering the totality of internal control.” 
(COSO, 2006) 
COSO says that management will review to determine whether its 
documentation is appropriate to support its assertion. “When management asserts 
to regulators, shareholders or other third parties on the design and operating 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, management accepts a 
higher level of personal risk and typically will require documentation of major 
processes within the accounting systems and important control activities to support 
its assertions. […] In considering the amount of documentation needed, the nature 
and extent of the documentation may be influenced by the company’s regulatory 
requirements. This does not necessarily mean that documentation will or should be 
more formal, but it does mean that there needs to be evidence that the controls are 
designed and working properly.” (COSO, 2006) 
COSO writes that determining whether a company’s internal control over 
financial reporting is effective involves a judgment. “Internal control has five 
components that work together to prevent or detect and correct material 
misstatements of financial reports. When the five components are present and 
functioning to the extent that management has reasonable assurance that financial 
statements are being prepared reliably, internal control can be deemed effective. 
While each component must be present and functioning, this does not mean, 
however, that each component should function identically or even at the same level 
in every company. Some trade-offs may exist between components. Accordingly, 
effective internal control does not necessarily mean a ‘gold standard’ of control is 
built into every process. A deficiency in one component might be mitigated by 
other controls in that component or by controls in another component strong 
enough such that the totality of control is sufficient to reduce the risk of 
misstatement to an acceptable level.” (COSO, 2006) 
Curtis and Borthick contend that many accounting firms have changed the 
way their auditors evaluate internal control; instead of preparing flowcharts 
documenting transaction flows, they only document the controls that have a 
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bearing on specific financial statement assertions. As Curtis and Borthick put it, 
this shift in documentation marks a change in the structure of the internal control 
evaluation task from transaction flow to control objective. This case presents 
documentation organized by control objective for internal control of a company’s 
purchasing cycle (the case includes discussion and objective format questions and 
is relatively short, which means it can be used as an in-class or out-of-class 
exercise or an in-class testing or assessment device on internal control evaluation). 
(Curtis, M.B., Faye Borthick, A., 1999) 
USGAO notes that federal policymakers and program managers are seeking 
ways to improve accountability. “As programs change and as agencies strive to 
improve operational processes and implement new technological developments, 
management must continually assess and evaluate its internal control to assure that 
the control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary.” 
(USGAO, 1999) 
According to USGAO, internal control is an integral component of an 
organization’s management that provides reasonable assurance that the following 
objectives are being achieved: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability 
of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Internal control is a continuous built-in component of operations, is affected by 
people, and provides reasonable assurance (not absolute assurance). USGAO 
argues that the five standards for internal control are: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communications, and monitoring. 
USGAO reasons that these standards define the minimum level of quality 
acceptable for internal control in government and provide the basis against which 
internal control is to be evaluated. “These standards apply to all aspects of an 
agency’s operations: programmatic, financial, and compliance. However, they are 
not intended to limit or interfere with duly granted authority related to developing 
legislation, rule-making or other discretionary policy-making in an agency. These 
standards provide a general framework. In implementing these standards, 
management is responsible for developing the detailed policies, procedures, and 
practices to fit their agency’s operations and to ensure that they are built into and 
an integral part of operations.” (USGAO, 1999) 
USGAO contends that management and employees should establish and 
maintain an environment throughout the organization that sets a positive and 
supportive attitude toward internal control and conscientious management; internal 
control should provide for an assessment of the risks the agency faces from both 
external and internal sources; internal control activities help ensure that 
management’s directives are carried out (the control activities should be effective 
and efficient in accomplishing the agency’s control objectives. USGAO provides 
several examples of control activities: top level reviews of actual performance; 
reviews by management at the functional or activity level; management of human 
capital; controls over information processing; physical control over vulnerable 
assets; establishment and review of performance measures and indicators; 
segregation of duties; proper execution of transactions and events; accurate and 
timely recording of transactions and events; access restrictions to and 
accountability for resources and records; appropriate documentation of transactions 
and internal control. 
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USGAO says that information should be recorded and communicated to 
management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a 
time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other 
responsibilities; internal control monitoring should assess the quality of 
performance over time and ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved. USGAO writes that rapid advances in information technology 
have highlighted the need for updated internal control guidance related to modern 
computer systems. Internal/management control helps government program 
managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. 
“Internal control is not one event, but a series of actions and activities that occur 
throughout an entity’s operations and on an ongoing basis. Internal control should 
be recognized as an integral part of each system that management uses to regulate 
and guide its operations rather than as a separate system within an agency. In this 
sense, internal control is management control that is built into the entity as a part of 
its infrastructure to help managers run the entity and achieve their aims on an 
ongoing basis.” (USGAO, 1999) 
USGAO asserts that risk assessment is the identification and analysis of 
relevant risks associated with achieving the objectives, “such as those defined in 
strategic and annual performance plans developed under the Government 
Performance and Results Act, and forming a basis for determining how risks 
should be managed. Management needs to comprehensively identify risks and 
should consider all significant interactions between the entity and other parties as 
well as internal factors at both the entity wide and activity level. Risk identification 
methods may include qualitative and quantitative ranking activities, management 
conferences, forecasting and strategic planning, and consideration of findings from 
audits and other assessments.” (USGAO, 1999) 
USGAO maintains that management should track major agency 
achievements and compare these to the plans, goals, and objectives established 
under the Government Performance and Results Act; managers need to compare 
actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and 
analyze significant differences. “Management should ensure that skill needs are 
continually assessed and that the organization is able to obtain a workforce that has 
the required skills that match those necessary to achieve organizational goals. 
Training should be aimed at developing and retaining employee skill levels to meet 
changing organizational needs. Qualified and continuous supervision should be 
provided to ensure that internal control objectives are achieved. Performance 
evaluation and feedback, supplemented by an effective reward system, should be 
designed to help employees understand the connection between their performance 
and the organization’s success. As a part of its human capital planning, 
management should also consider how best to retain valuable employees, plan for 
their eventual succession, and ensure continuity of needed skills and abilities.” 
(USGAO, 1999) 
KPMG recommends that the focus should be on developing and 
implementing an embedded process; this may mean not being in a position to 
comply fully in year one. KPMG recommends that for most organizations the 
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formulation of a Risk Committee would be beneficial and appropriate (it is 
important that Audit Committees do not become overburdened and deflected from 
their already significant obligations). KPMG recommends that the organization 
adopt/devise a control framework as a standard against which to assess the 
effectiveness of its system of internal controls. 
KPMG recommends that all directors, including the nonexecutive directors, 
ensure that they are satisfied that the Board’s statement on internal control provides 
meaningful high-level information that enables shareholders to evaluate how the 
principles of good governance have been applied. KPMG recommends that the 
Board ensure that internal audit is in a position to provide the Board with much of 
the assurance it requires regarding the effectiveness of the system of internal 
control (it should not only assess the “parts”, but also the “corporate glue” holding 
the parts together. 
KPMG recommends that material joint ventures and associates should, as far 
as possible, be dealt with as part of the group for the purposes of applying the 
Turnbull guidance; even some of the largest groups have recognized that even 
though they may believe they have all the necessary controls in place, they are not 
in a position to state so with certainty, or that all components that contribute to the 
system of internal control are adequately codified. “Internal control is one of the 
principal means by which risk is managed. Other devices used to manage risk 
include the transfer of risk to third parties, sharing risks, contingency planning and 
the withdrawal from unacceptably risky activities. Of course, companies can accept 
risk too. Getting the balance right is the essence of successful business – to 
knowingly take risk, rather than be unwittingly exposed to it.”( KPMG, 1999) 
According to KPMG, the advantages of embracing Turnbull may include: 
exploitation of business opportunities earlier, increased likelihood of achieving 
business objectives, increased market capitalization, more effective use of 
management time, lower cost of capital, fewer unforecast threats to the business, 
more effective management of change, and clearer strategy setting. 
KPMG notes that an internal control system encompasses the policies, 
processes, tasks, behaviours and other aspects of a company that, taken together: 
facilitate its effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond 
appropriately to significant business, operational, financial, compliance and other 
risks to achieving the company’s objectives, help ensure the quality of internal and 
external reporting (this requires the maintenance of proper records and processes 
that generate a flow of timely, relevant and reliable information from within and 
outside the organization), and help ensure compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, and also internal policies with respect to the conduct of business.  
KPMG contends that the costs of control must be balanced against the 
benefits, including the risks it is designed to manage; the system of control must 
include procedures for reporting immediately to appropriate levels of management 
any significant control failings or weaknesses that are identified together with 
details of corrective action being undertaken; control can help minimize the 
occurrence of errors and breakdowns but cannot provide absolute assurance that 
they will not occur; the system of control should be embedded in the operations of 
the company and form part of its culture. 
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KPMG argues that linking the identification of key business risks to the 
company’s strategic business objectives may be part of the normal financial 
calendar supporting the strategic planning and budgeting process (it will be 
important to ensure this process is sufficiently balanced in its appraisal of the 
financial and non-financial risks). KPMG states that an effective risk assessment 
process addresses both financial risks (such as credit, market and liquidity risk) and 
non-financial risks (such as operational, legal and environmental risk); the process 
should include an evaluation of the risks to determine which are controllable by the 
company and which are not. “The board should identify controls appropriate to 
maintain the key business risks within the defined risk tolerance levels set by the 
Board, bearing cost/benefit considerations in mind, or review the process by which 
this is done and endorse the conclusions. The Board should also be satisfied that 
suitable individuals have a clear responsibility for maintaining dynamic risk 
identification and assessment process and related internal controls. The Board may 
not know the fine detail of how all risks that could lead to a material loss are 
controlled but should be satisfied that proper control policies, procedures and 
activities have been established to support their control objectives. The design of 
controls should be based on generally accepted control criteria which have been 
approved by the Board for this purpose and include both preventative and detective 
controls.” (KPMG, 1999) 
KPMG reasons that although internal audit should maintain independence 
from management, they can perform more than just a monitoring role. “In many 
companies they also act as facilitators and internal advisors to management on 
effective means of controlling business risks. Internal audit arrangements naturally 
vary, but they have the potential to play a central role within the monitoring 
process. […] Responsibility for reviewing and concluding on the effectiveness of 
internal control rests with the Board. However, the external auditors are likely to 
have helpful knowledge and access to specialist consultants with expertise in 
specific aspects of risk management and control evaluation. Such procedures are 
outwitting the scope of the statutory audit, but could be provided as part of a 
separate engagement.” (KPMG, 1999) 
 
Conclusions 
 
The reports from management and/or others qualified to prepare them in 
accordance with agreed procedures should provide a balanced assessment of the 
significant risks and the effectiveness of the system of internal control in the area 
covered. “The Board’s annual assessment should consider issues dealt with in the 
reports it has reviewed during the year together with additional information 
necessary to ensure the Board has taken account of all significant aspects of 
internal control for the company’s accounting period and the period up to the date 
of approval of the annual report and accounts. This suggests that the Board must, at 
least, update its annual assessment directly before the annual report and accounts 
are approved.” (KPMG, 1999) 
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KPMG remarks that disclosure goes beyond internal financial account; 
emphasis is on how the Board has reviewed the process for identifying, evaluating 
and managing the company’s key risks rather than a description of key controls in 
place. The Board may wish to provide additional information in the annual report 
and accounts to assist the understanding of the company’s risk management 
process and system of internal control. KPMG argues that the disclosures go 
beyond internal financial control (many of the disclosure requirements do not refer 
directly to control at all, but to risk); the disclosures are, in the main, concerned 
with how the Board has reviewed the effectiveness of the system of internal 
control; no opinion on the effectiveness of the system of internal control is 
required; additional disclosures are no longer required in respect of weaknesses in 
internal financial control that have resulted in material losses, contingencies or 
uncertainties which require disclosure in the financial statements or in the auditors’ 
report. “Companies in the habit of providing shareholders with meaningful 
governance disclosures should have few problems with the new disclosures. 
However, those companies who traditionally take a minimalist approach should not 
see the new requirements as an opportunity to disclose virtually nothing about their 
risk management process and system of internal control. Such an approach neither 
encourages high standards of corporate behaviour nor provides shareholders with a 
meaningful insight into how the Board has maintained a sound system of internal 
control to safeguard their investment and the company’s assets. Indeed, the 
guidance encourages Boards to provide additional information in the annual report 
and accounts to assist understanding of the company’s risk management processes 
and system of internal control.” (KPMG, 1999) 
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